



JONES ACT NOT APPLICABLE TO ALIEN SEAMAN
HURT ON FOREIGN SHIP IN FOREIGN PORT
A Danish seaman signed shipping articles in New York for a voyage
on a Danish ship. The articles specifically provided that the rights of the
crew were to be governed by Danish law. While the ship was at Havana,
Cuba, he was injured on board ship by the negligence of a fellow seaman
and in accordance with Danish law maintenance and cure were paid. On
return to New York the seaman brought an in personam action under the
Jones Act' for negligence against the shipowner's agent in the United
States. In the district court he was awarded a verdict, which the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed per curiam.2  On certiorari3 the
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the law of the flag should prevail.
Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
Congress has the power to regulate foreign ships, both while in
United States waters,4 and to some extent extraterritorially as a require-
ment of using United States ports.5 Thus it has been said of the uncondi-
tioned words "any seaman"'6 in the Jones Act, § 33, that the only problem
is one of statutory construction.7 However, in the absence of a clear
1. 41 STAT. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §688 (1946). "Any seaman who shall suffer
personal injury in the course of his employment may, at his election, maintain
an action for damages at law, with the right of trial by jury, and in such action
all statutes of the United States modifying or extending the common-law right
or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees shall apply . .. ."
The Federal Employers' Liability Act provides: "Every common carrier by rail-
road . . . shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is
employed by such carrier in such commerce . . . for such injury or death resulting
in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees
of such carrier . . . ." 35 STAT. 65 (1908), 45 U.S.C. §51 (1946).
2. Larsen v. Lauritzen, 196 F.2d 220 (2d Cir. 1952).
3. Four foreign nations, Great Britain, Norway, Denmark, and the Netherlands,
filed amicus briefs requesting that the Supreme Court grant certiorari. 344 U.S.
810 (1952).
4. Cunard Steamship Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100 (1923); Strathearn Steam-
ship Co. v. Dillon, 252 U.S. 348 (1920); Patterson v. Bark Eudora, 190 U.S. 169
(1903) ; Potter, Jurisdiction over Alien Merchant Vessels, 2 Wis. L. Rxv. 340
(1924).
5. See Patterson v. Bark Eudora, 190 U.S. 169, 178 (1903) ; JEssuP, THE LAw
Op TmTRrroRrA. WATERS AND MnITimE JURIsDIcTION 187 (1927). Consider the
extra-territorial effect of required life-saving equipment: ". . . Provided, That
foreign vessels leaving ports of the United States shall comply with the rules
herein prescribed as to life-saving appliances, their equipment, and the manning of
same." 38 STAT. 1170 (1915), 46 U.S.C. §481 (1946).
6. See note 1 supra.
7. See instant case at 578; Taylor v. Atlantic Maritime Co., 179 F.2d 597, 600
(2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied sub nont. Atlantic Maritime Co. v. Rankin, 341 U.S. 915
(1951).
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Congressional intent,8 admiralty statutes (in common with all statutes
affecting foreign countries) are interpreted in consonance with principles
of international law 9 as well as in terms of the literal meaning of words.' 0
The reason is to avoid the causes of friction leading to retaliation, and to
eliminate conflicting and changing regulations aboard ship." One of the
tenets of international law is that matters relating to the internal affairs
of a ship will be governed by the law of the country whose flag the ship
flies; 12 a suit for negligence under the Jones Act relates to the internal
affairs of a ship; '3 thus the instant Court holds the Jones Act should not
govern foreign ships.
Courts have held the law of the flag to govern the application of the
Jones Act to United States ships regardless of the nationality of the sea-
man,' 4 and registry of a ship by an American owner in a foreign country
does not avoid liability, since it is held that the relevant law of the flag is
that of the owner.' 5 Where a United States citizen sets up a corporation
in a foreign country as owner of a ship the courts have not found liability
but probably should on the basis of ultimate ownership being in an Amer-
ican citizen. 10 With regard to foreign ships courts have sometimes con-
sidered various factors other than the law of the flag: the nationality of
8. The only intent of Congress expressed was the desire to benefit American
interests. SEN. REP. No. 573, 66th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1920). The argument that
anything which imposes an additional burden on foreign shipowners is a benefit to
American seamen was properly disposed of by the Court as addressed to the wrong
branch of the government. Instant case at 593. The intent to cover American
ships only is also indicated by the in personam remedy given by the Jones Act, so
that even if "any seaman" means any seaman, many aliens will be barred for lack
of an agent of the foreign shipowner in the United States aganist whom suit can be
brought. Further, there is a venue problem, as the suit must be brought in the district
of the district court in which the shipowner resides or principal office is located.
9. See Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64, 118 (U.S. 1804).
10. See Cheatham and Reese, Choice of Applicable Law, 52 CoL. L. Rav. 959,
961 (1952); Legis., 49 HARv. L R v. 319 (1935).
11. These ideas are sometimes called comity. See Wildenhus's Case, 120 U.S.
1, 12 (1887).
12. RESTATEmENT, CONFLIcT OF LAws §§ 405, 406 (1934). This rule is com-
monly rationalized on the idea that a ship is part of the territory whose flag it
flies, but is really grounded in the desire to promote commerce. See United States v.
Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 155-6 (1933) (ship considered extension of territory of
sovereign whose flag it flies).
13. O'Neill v. Cunard White Star, Ltd., 160 F.2d 446 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
332 U.S. 773 (1947); Taylor v. Atlantic Maritime Co., 179 F.2d 597 (2d Cir.
1950), cert. denied sub norn. Atlantic Maritime Co. v. Rankin, 341 U.S. 915 (1951)
(by implication).
14. Wenzler v. Robin Line S.S. Co., 277 Fed. 812 (W.D. Wash. 1921).
Cf. In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891).
15. Gerradin v. United Fruit Co., 60 F.2d 927 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S.
642 (1932) ; Carroll v. United States, 133 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1943). See Torgersen
v. Hutton, 243 App. Div. 31, 276 N.Y. Supp. 348 (2d Dep't 1934), aff'd, 267 N.Y.
535, 196 N.E. 566, cert. denied, 296 U.S. 602 (1935) (Jones Act held applicable on
vessel half-owned and wholly operated by an American citizen).
16. See 17 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 549 (1949), discussing Sonneson v. Panama
Transport Co., 298 N.Y. 262, 82 N.E.2d 569 (1948), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 919
(1949). In a recent decision a federal district court held, on the basis of the instant
case, that liability under the Jones Act extends to a ship owned by a foreign corpora-
tion all of whose stock was owned by a domestic corporation. Zielinski v. Empresa
Hondurena de Vapores, 113 F. Supp. 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
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the seaman, the place of injury, the place where the shipping articles were
signed, and the nature of the voyage. Nationality raises a problem only
in the case of an American seaman on a foreign ship. Usually he is con-
sidered bound by foreign law regarding the internal economy of the vessel,'
7
yet in 1942 recovery was allowed an alien, a long time resident of the
United States, where the shipping contract was signed in the United States,
for a voyage to begin and end in the United States, and the injury occurred
in United States waters.' 8 Aside from the longshoremen cases,' 9 this was
one of the first opinions not following the law of the flag, being based
instead on an injury in United States waters to one considered by the
court the equivalent of an American citizen. Yet some years later the
same court held that a long-resident alien similarly regarded an American
citizen could not recover where the injury occurred on the high seas and
the shipping articles were signed in a foreign port,2° thus negating the
thought that any American citizen on a foreign ship was covered. Con-
cerning a foreign seaman on a foreign ship, in The Paula 2 a seaman who
signed on in a foreign country and was injured in United States waters
was denied recovery, the court following the law of the flag in preference
to the law of the place, but in Kyriakos v. Goulandris,22 over the dissent of
Judge Learned Hand, recovery was allowed a foreign seaman who signed
on and was injured in the United States. The logical conclusion of
Kyriakos was expressed by Taylor v. Atlantic Maritime Co.,23 in which
a seaman who signed on in the United States and was hurt at sea was
permitted recovery on the rationale that any foreign seaman who signed
shipping articles in the United States could invoke the Jones Act, as the
right to sue was part of the terms of the contract. The Taylor case was
factually similar to the instant case except the injury occurred on the high
seas instead of a foreign port, and was the reason for the per curiam
affirmance of the instant case in the circuit court, though the New York
Court of Appeals had reached a contrary result on essentially the same
facts.24  Thus departure from. the law of the flag caused confusion as to
just which factor or combination of factors was necessary to Jones Act
17. See In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891).
18. Gambera v. Bergoty, 132 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 742
(1943), 56 HAv. L. REv. 822 (1943) ; accord, Shorter v. Bermuda & West Indies
S.S. Co., 57 F.2d 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1932) (as the ship was tied to a pier, the case
was analogized to Uravic v. Jarka Co., 282 U.S. 234 (1931)).
19. Uravic v. Jarka Co., 282 U.S. 234 (1931) (longshoreman working momen-
tarily on a foreign ship in a United States port allowed recovery under the Jones
Act); Williams v. Oceanic Stevedoring Co., 27 F.2d 905 (S.D. Tex. 1928).
20. O'Neill v. Cunard White Star, Ltd., 160 F.2d 446 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
332 U.S. 773 (1947).
21. 91 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nonr. Peters v. Lauritzen, 302 U.S.
750 (1937).
22. 151 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1945).
23. 179 F.2d 597, 600 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied sub nor. Atlantic Maritime
Co. v. Ranldn, 341 U.S. 915 (1951).
24. Sonnesen v. Panama Transport Co., 298 N.Y. 262, 82 N.E.2d 569 (1948),
cert. denied, 337 U.S. 919 (1949).
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coverage, and led to discrimination, with some foreign seamen being cov-
ered and others not, depending both on the court used and the factors
involved.
The instant case, doubtless the prospective leading decision on Jones
Act coverage of foreign seamen, resolves some of the confusion, for al-
though the Court weighs and analyses the relative importance of all the
various considerations in subjecting foreign ships to the Jones Act, the
law of the flag and its basis, freedom of commerce, are stated to be the
most important factors. 25 Indeed, the ultimate thrust of the opinion is
the extent to which previous decisions based on other factors are over-
ruled 26 and the law of the flag held to be controlling, although one possible
exception may be where the injury occurs in United States waters to a
United States citizen. Courts could reach this latter conclusion by con-
sidering both the convenience of a United States court and the place of
the injury as outweighing the law of the flag.27  Applying the law of the
flag seems sound on economic grounds, for the anomalous situation should
be avoided that on a foreign ship only some seamen are covered because
of the fortuitous circumstance that they signed the shipping contract in
the United States, or that the injury happened in United States waters.
If only some are eligible to benefit from the Jones Act, foreign shipowners
will try to hire those who are not, and the resulting discrimination is one
reason against extending coverage to a United States seaman on a foreign
vessel. Although the application of the Jones Act to United States ships
doubtless increases the cost of operation,2 8 yet so many other factors also
increase the cost, as compared to foreign ships, that it seems vain indeed
to argue that the courts should extend the Jones Act to foreign ships to
help equalize expenses. Freedom of commerce and avoidance of causes
of friction and retaliation should govern the application of doubtful statu-
tory language where foreign countries are involved. If local liability laws
are to be extended to foreign ships or if the law of the flag is not to be
followed, either to equalize costs or to protect foreign seamen, then Con-
gress, not the courts, should so determine.
29
25. "These considerations [principles of comity] are of such weight in favor of
Danish and against American law in this case that it must prevail unless some
heavy counterweight appears." Instant case at 586.
26. It would seem that both Taylor v. Atlantic Maritime Co., supra note 7, and
Kyriakos v. Goulandris, supra note 22, have been overruled. Since the place of sign-
ing the contract was termed not a "substantial influence," the principal cause of
conflict will probably be an injury occurring in United States waters. See The
Fletero v. Arios, 206 F.2d 267, 273 (4th Cir. 1953) (dictum by Judge Parker based
on instant case that the law of the flag governs a foreign seaman on a foreign ship
in a United States port as to Jones Act coverage).
27. See Gambera v. Bergoty, 132 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S.
742 (1943).
28. This was the argument made by the Seafarers International Union, AFL.
See note 8 supra.
29. See O'Neill v. Cunard White Star, Ltd., 160 F.2d 446, 448 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 332 U.S. 773 (1947); Taylor v. Atlantic Maritime Co., 179 F.2d 597, 600




STATE TAXATION OF PRIVATE CONTRACTOR
FOR PRIVILEGE OF STORING GOVERNMENT
FUEL HELD VALID
Government-owned gasoline was stored in private tanks leased by Esso
in Tennessee I under a contract whereby the government agreed to assume
liability for all state taxes.2 Tennessee levied a tax upon Esso of six cents
per gallon for the privilege of storing gasoline in the state.3 In Esso's
suit to recover the tax, the government intervened as the party ultimately
liable, claiming that the tax was barred by the doctrine of intergovernmental
immunity. The Supreme Court of Tennessee found the tax valid,4 and
the United States Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the tax was im-
posed on the privilege of storage, not on the worth of the government
property, and hence did not violate the government's immunity from state
taxation. Esso Standard Oil v. Evans, 345 U.S. 495 (1953).
The principle that functions, agencies and property of the Federal
Government are not to be burdened by state taxation was first enunciated
in McCulloch v. Maryland.5 This immunity, once liberally extended to
private individuals closely associated with the government, has been with-
drawn with regard to the income of government employees 6 and the pro-
tection against state gross production taxes afforded a lessee of mineral
rights of government lands.7 The encroachment on the formerly broad
scope of intergovernmental immunity has been particularly noticeable where
private contractors have been involved.8 In spite of the traditional rule
that private property used in performance of a government contract is sub-
1. The gasoline was the property of the Defense Supplies Corporation, owned
by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 6 FED. REG. 2972, as amended 6 FED.
Rrz. 3363, and specifically exempt from state storage and use taxes, 15 U.S.C. § 610
(1946).
2. The fact that the Government agreed to assume liability for state taxes would
not waive any immunity which might have existed. United States v. Allegheny
County, 322 U.S. 174, 189 (1944).
3. TENN. ConE ANN. §§ 1126-1147 (Williams 1934). This statute provides that:
"The term 'distributor' means and includes every person who engages in the business
in the state of refining, manufacturing, producing, or compounding gasoline or dis-
tillate, and selling or storing the same in this state . . . (§ 1126)
"Every distributor when engaged in such business in this state, shall pay to the
state comptroller . . . a special privilege tax . . . in an amount equal to six
cents for each gallon of gasoline . . . sold, stored or distributed by him in this
state . . ." (§ 1127).
4. 250 S.W.2d 569 (Tenn. 1952).
5. 4 Wheat. 316 (U.S. 1819).
6. Compare Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113 (U.S. 1871) and New York ex rel.
Rogers v. Graves, 299 U.S. 401 (1937) with Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe,
306 U.S. 466 (1939).
7. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Texas Co., 336 U.S. 342 (1948).
8. For a discussion and analysis of the entire field of intergovernmental immunity
see Powell, The Waning of Intergovernmental Tax Immunities, 58 HA v. L. Rv. 633
(1945); Powell, The Remiant of Intergovernmental Tax Immunities, 58 HAv. L.
Ray. 757 (1945). As to the immunity of the States from the Federal Government's
taxation see Rakestraw, The Reciprocal Rule of Governmental Tax Immunity-A
Legal Myth, 3 ORLA. L. Rav. 131 (1950).
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ject to state taxation,9 earlier doctrine had exempted contractors from
state taxes on the withdrawal from storage of fuel which they sold under
contract to the government on the grounds of a direct economic burden upon
the United States.10 But at present, after a complete metamorphosis in
the doctrine, the essential question, provided that the tax is nondis-
criminatory, is not whether the economic burden ultimately rests on the
government, but upon whom the liability for the tax legally falls.1
Accordingly, a state may levy a gross receipts tax upon income received
by a contractor from government transactions,' 2 and materials purchased
for use in the fulfillment of a government cost plus contract are subject
to a sales tax imposed on the contractor.' 3 The determining element in
the present case was thus whether the tax was laid upon the government
property (gasoline) directly and thereby banned by McCulloch, or whether
it was validated under the modern rule because it fell upon Esso alone in
its capacity as distributor.
In rejecting the government's contention that the tax was one on
property the Court distinguished United States v. Allegheny County 14
in which the county levied a property tax upon Mesta Machine Company
and included in the assessment the value of government owned machinery
leased to the company. Despite the fact that the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania had long construed the tax as one only on real estate, the Court
held that it was in substance an ad valorem tax upon property of the
United States and therefore invalid. The Court reasoned that since the
value of government property was in part the measure of the tax, the tax
was on all the property rather than on the real estate alone. In the present
case, the Court stated that the tax was not based on the value of govern-
ment property, but was imposed on the privilege of storing and Was
graduated in accordance with the exercise of such privilege. The resulting
distinction between using the value of the property rather than its amount
in computing a tax to be paid by a private contractor does not seem to be
substantial-in both situations it is the property of the United States which
determines the tax to be paid. But a factor which may have contributed
to the Court's refusal to consider the tax here as one "on" property was its
previous characterization of this type of tax, one extremely prevalent
9. Choctaw, 0. & G.R.R. v. Mackey, 256 U.S. 531 (1921); Gromer v. Standard
Dredging Co., 224 U.S. 362 (1912) ; Central Pacific R.R. v. California, 162 U.S. 91
(1896).
10. Graves v. Texas Co., 298 U.S. 393 (1936); Panhandle Oil Co. v. Knox, 277
U.S. 218 (1928).
11. "The contractors were thus purchasers of the lumber, within the meaning of
the taxing statute, and as such were subject to the tax. They were not relieved of
the liability to pay the tax either because the contractors, in a loose and general
sense, were acting for the Government in purchasing the lumber or, as the Alabama
Supreme Court seems to have thought, because the economic burden of the tax
imposed upon the purchaser would be shifted to the Government by reason of its
contract to reimburse the contractors." Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1, 12
(1941). The Texas and Panhandle cases, supra note 10, were here disclaimed as
no longer tenable. Id. at 9 (1941).
12. James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937).
13. Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1 (1941).
14. 322 U.S. 174 (1944).
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among the states, as one on the exercise of a privilege.' 5 There would be
far fewer repercussions to invalidating Pennsylvania's uniquely applied real
estate tax, than on construing the present privilege tax as one on property
and thereby opening new issues long considered settled by state courts
and legislatures.'
The close limitation of Allegheny County and resultant reaffirmance
of the legal liability test continues the boon to state revenues by permitting
the states to tax indirectly what they would be prohibited from taxing
directly. The limitation on sources of state revenues which would other-
wise be caused by the ever-increasing use of private contractors by the
Federal Government was unquestionably an important factor in the instant
decision.' 7 Moreover, the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity is thus
ostensibly preserved, although the Federal Government bears the economic
burden either by express agreement or through higher costs; and if the
government strongly desires immunity it can always accomplish it in
accord with the legal liability theory either by leasing the tanks and stand-
ing as the distributor on whom the tax falls, or by expressly immunizing
the private contractor through congressional legislation.' 8 In any event,
any conjecture which may have arisen from Allegheny County as to a
broadening of the immunity doctrine with regard to private contractors
seems to be effectually quelled by the present decision.
Cororations&-
DONATION TO EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION
SUSTAINED UNDER STATUTES
AND COMMON LAW
The directors of plaintiff corporation, which was organized to engage
in industry for profit, voted to contribute $1500 to Princeton University
for the general educational purposes of that institution. When minority
shareholders objected, plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment to validate
1 15. Monamotor Oil Co. v. Johnson, 292 U.S. 86 (1934); Bowman v. Continental
Oil Co., 256 U.S. 642 (1921). In addition, the Supreme Court of Tennessee held
the tax in the instant case to be a privilege tax. State v. Hamilton County, 176
Tenn. 519, 144 S.W.2d 749 (1940) (cases cited). However, where a federal right
was involved, the court has never considered itself bound by the state court's interpre-
tation. Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Board of Equalization, 329 U.S. 69 (1946);
United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174 (1944); Carpenter v. Shaw, 280
U.S. 363 (1929).
16. Attacks upon these taxes on the theory that they do not conform to the
state's constitutional requirements for property taxes have been consistently denied.
Pauley v. California, 75 F.2d 120 (9th Cir. 1934). See cases cited in Note, 111
A.L.R. 185, 198 (1937); Note, 84 A.L.R. 839, 857 (1933).
17. Instant case at 500. As to compensating the states for their loss in revenue
because of their inability to levy a direct tax upon government property see Guandolo,
Federal Payments to States and Local Government Respecting Property of the United
States, 101 U. oF PA. L. Rv. 509 (1953).
18. Carson v. Roane-Anderson Co., 342 U.S. 232 (1952).
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the appropriation under state statutes which authorized limited corporate
contributions to various non-profit institutions conducive to the public
welfare,1 and on the common law doctrine which permitted gifts directly
benefiting the corporation. The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that
the donation was valid under the common law, and that the statutes were
within the state's reserved power to amend corporate charters, notwith-
standing defendants' contention that the statutes violated the contract clause
of federal and state constitutions. A. P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 26
N.J. Super. 106 (Ch.), 97 A.2d 186, aff'd, 98 A.2d 581 (N.J. Sup. Ct.),
appeal dismissed, 22 U.S.L. WEEK 3111 (1953).
The common law rule, developed at a time when the purposes for
incorporation were wholly economic and strictly construed, 2 prohibited
charitable donations by profit-seeking corporations 3 unless the donor could
show a direct benefit to the corporation.- A leading case permitted a
corporation located in an isolated community to contribute to a church,
school and free library because of the benefit in insuring the continued and
faithful services of its employees.5 The broadest interpretation of a direct
benefit was an English case, Evans v. Brunner, Mond & Co.,6 which al-
lowed a chemical manufacturer's contribution to several English universities
for the "furtherance of scientific research" on the grounds that it would
help establish a "reservoir of trained experts"7 from which the company
might choose its employees. The instant case goes even further than the
Evans holding by sustaining a donation for the "general purposes" of an
educational institution. The fear that the broadest cases might not be
followed, 8 however, and the fact that these views required the corporation to
1. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14:3-13 et seq. (Supp. 1952). Domestic corporations are
given power to aid ". . institutions or organizations engaged in community fund,
hospital, charitable, philanthropic, educational, scientific or benevolent activities or
patriotic or civic activities conducive to the betterment of social and economic condi-
tions. . . ." Id. § 14:3-13.2. The statutory limitations prohibit contributions:
which do not protect corporate interests (Id. § 14:3-13) ; which exceed one percent
of capital and surplus, unless shareholders are notified, and if twenty-five percent of
them object further gifts must be approved by the shareholders (Id. §§ 14:3-
13, 14:3-13.2) ; to donee owning more than ten percent of the voting stock of the
donor corporation. Id. (§ 14:3-13.2).
2. C. A. CooKE, CoRPoRATIcN, TRUST, AND COMPANY C. 8 (1950).
3. 6A FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS § 2939 (Rev. ed. 1950); BALLAN-
TINE, CoRPoRATioNs § 85 (1946).
4. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Hotchkiss, 136 App. Div. 150, 120 N.Y. Supp.
649 (3d Dep't 1909) (corporation allowed to build hospital to care for its employees
who acquire tuberculosis); Richelieu Hotel Co. v. International Military Encamp-
ment Co., 140 Ill. 248, 29 N.E. 1044 (1892) (hotel allowed to subscribe toward project
tending to attract a large number of people to the community) ; Cousens, How Far
Corporations May Contribute to Charity, 35 VA. L. REv. 401 (1949) ; Note, Dona-
tions by a Business Corporation as Intra Vires, 31 COL. L. REv. 136 (1931).
5. Steinway v. Steinway & Sons, 17 Misc. 43, 40 N.Y. Supp. 718 (Sup. Ct.
1896).
6. [1921] 1 Ch. 359 (1920), 34 HARv. L. REv. 555 (1921).
7. Evans v. Brunner, Mond & Co., [1921] 1 Ch. 359, 367 (1920).
8. Cousens, supra note 4, at 423. But see Bell, Corporation Support of Educa-
tion: The Legal Basis, 38 A.B.A.J. 119, 120 (1952).
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show an economic benefit to itself, have led at least twenty-nine states,9
by exercising their reserved power to amend corporate charters,' ° to pass
statutes which permit corporations to make charitable contributions. This
reservation has been construed by the majority of states as a part of share-
holder incorporating agreements made subsequent to enactment of the
reservation so as to allow all corporate charter amendments, subject only
to due process limitations." However, New Jersey, under Federal and
state contract clauses,12 still prohibits amendments of the incorporating
agreement among the shareholders unless a definite public interest is in-
volved in the change.' 3 The instant court, in the first constitutional test
of any contribution statute,' 4 finds that public gain through reasonable
gifts to charity outweighs any impairment of shareholders' righTTh-d6ugh
expenditure of these funds.
Constitutionally, the United States Supreme Court and the majority
of states have approved, under the reserve power, corporate charter amend-
ments which are more fundamental than the present one.' 5 Corporations,
for example, have long been permitted to impose additional liability on
non-assessable stock.'6 The charitable contribution statutes seem to meet
9. F. E. ANDREws, CoRroRAxroN GIVNG 235 (1952) (tventy-six statutes, re-
produced). The American Bar Association has been instrumental in the adoption
of these statutes in the several states. See de Capriles and Garret, Legality of Cor-
porate Support to Education: A Survey of Current Developments, 38 A.B.AJ. 209,
211 (1952).
10. This power has been reserved in the charters, state constitutions or general
incorporation laws ever since the United States Supreme Court held in Trustees of
Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518 (U.S. 1819), that the corporate
charter was a "contract" to be protected from impairment by the state legislatures
under the contract clause of the Federal Constitution. 7 FLErcHER, op. cit. supra
note 3, § 3658.
11. BALLANTINE, op. cit. supra note 3, §275; STEVENs, LAw OF CoRPoRATIoNs
944 (2d ed. 1949).
A few states, including New Jersey, note 12 infra, have narrowly interpreted
the reserve power. See Dodd, Amendment of Corporate Articles wnder the New
Ohio General Corporation Act, 4 U. OF Ciu. L. REv. 129, 160 (1930).
12. New Jersey interprets a corporate charter as including contracts between the
state and the corporation, the corporation and its shareholders, and the shareholders
inter se; the reserved power to amend corporate charters does not affect the share-
holders' inter se contract. Faunce v. Boost Co., 15 N.J. Super. 534, 83 A.2d 649
(Ch. 1951), 37 CORNELL L.Q. 768 (1952) (corporation held not to have power to
alter voting rights by amendment), Zabriskie v. Hackensack & N.Y.R.R., 18 N.J.
Eq. 178 (Ch. 1867) (railroad prohibited from extending its lines by amendment).
13. E.g., In re Collins-Doan Co., 3 N.J. 382, 70 A.2d 159 (1949) (corporation
allowed to dissolve due to shareholder deadlock); Bingham v. Savings Investment
& Trust Co., 101 N.J. Eq. 413, 138 Atl. 321 (Ch. 1902) (corporation allowed to re-
tire preferred stock by purchase with bonds or bond proceeds).
14. Contributions were sustained under a Texas statute, but no constitutional
issues were raised. TEx. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1349 (Vernon 1945), James McCord
Co. v. Citizens' Hotel Co., 287 S.W. 906 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926); A. J. Anderson
Co. v. Citizens' Hotel Co., 8 S.W.2d 702 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
15. Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 310 U.S. 32, 40 and cases cited
n. 17 (1940) (rights of certificate holders to withdraw from association restricted) ;
Curran, Minority Stockholders and the Amendment of Corporate Charters, 32 Micn.
L. REv. 743, 757 and cases cited n.56-58 (1934) ; Lattin, A Primer on Fundamental
Corporate Changes, 1 WEst. REs. L. REv. 3, 9 (1949).
16. Somerville v. St. Louis Mining & Milling Co., 46 Mont. 268, 127 Pac. 464
(1912), Note, 72 A.L.R. 1252 (1931).
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the due process requirements since they neither deprive the corporation
of any property nor take away any rights of shareholders or creditors.
17
The public interest standard of New Jersey 18 would also appear to be met
by a contribution statute so long as the benefits which charitable institutions
render accrue to society as a whole. Some states, however, permit cor-
porate donations to special interests, such as religious institutions, 9 which
render services partly according to religious belief; in addition, this compels
the minority shareholders to contribute to beliefs contrary to their own.
20
A continual risk of corporate giving, control of the donee, has led a few
states to prohibit donations to influence legislation 2' or election cam-
paigns, 22 while others specifically authorize donations to veterans organiza-
tions 23 notwithstanding their political activities. If donations to all chari-
ties were prohibited for fear of corporate control, however, many social-
welfare services would be curtailed, since personal giving, the traditional
source of charitable funds, has decreased due to the effects of inflation and
high income taxes. Another alternative, support from tax revenues, may
involve control by government which, although representative of the entire
public, would substitute a single, influential entity for the numerous cor-
porate contributors. Educational and research institutions would be par-
ticularly affected as sources of independent thought. Another danger of
corporate giving, harm to shareholders and creditors through excessive
gifts, may be prevented by statutory provisions which limit yearly dona-
tions to a certain percentage of profits 24 or combined capital and surplus.2 5
Collusion may be lessened by prohibiting donations to a donee who owns
17. McNulty v. W. & J. Sloane, 184 Misc. 835, 54 N.Y.S.2d 253 (Sup. Ct.
1945).
18. Amendments permitted under this standard could also be validated under
the state police power. See Note, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 768, 772 (1952). The lower
court in the instant case sustained the New Jersey statutes under the police power.
Instant case at 194-96.
19. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 32, § 157.5 (m) (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1952);
Wis. STAT. § 180.04(12) (1951).
20. For this reason many corporations refrain from donating to strictly sectarian
religious organizations. ANDREWS, op. cit. supra note 9, at 221-22. The Model
Act which the American Bar Association submitted to the various state legislatures,
note 9 supra, did not contain the word "religion". Carrington, Corporate Donations,
8 Bus. LAwYER 22, 27 (1953). A corporate policy which permits religious contribu-
tions in proportion to the beliefs of shareholders seems a fair solution.
21. PA. STAT. 'ANN. tit. 15, § 716(b) (Purdon Supp. 1952); W. VA. CODE
ANN. §3015 (1949).
22. TEx. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1349 (Vernon 1948).
23. MINN. STAT. ANN. §300.66(3) (West Supp. 1952); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 3015 (1949).
24. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-26(12) (1950) (five percent of net income); IND.
ANN. STAT. § 25-211b (Burns Supp. 1953) (contributions must be deductible under
federal income tax law); MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS art. 23, § 9(a) (10) (Flack
1951) (out of profits) ; Miss. Gen. Laws c. 227, § 1 (1952) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 4085
(Williams 1934) (out of earnings).
25. OHIo GEN. CODE ANN. § 8623-119 (Page Supp. 1952); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:3-13.2 (Supp. 1952) (one percent of capital and surplus); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 55-26(12) (1950) (assets must exceed liabilities immediately after gift).
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a certain percentage of the donor corporation's shares,20 or to a donee if
any part of its earnings inure to the benefit of any shareholder or private
individual.27  Although some state statutes permit contributions for the
"public welfare" without further prescribing the type of eligible donees
or the total amount of yearly corporate donations, 28 the New Jersey
statutes approved in the instant case limit both the amount of corporate
donations and the nature of the institutions which may receive them.29
Since many states lack statutes, and since others require that dona-
tions protect corporate interests,30 the common law rule requiring direct
benefit to the corporation is still important. The court in the instant case
found such benefit in minimizing government control of education and in
goodwill, although the amount of the gift was too small to be widely
publicized when related to the size and scope of Princeton University.
A factor not mentioned by the court, federal income tax deductions,3 ' by
lowering the corporation's net cost of giving to charity, has greatly in-
creased corporate donations in recent years,32 and, under certain circum-
stances, may even result in a positive financial saving to the donor cor-
poration 33
Criminal Law-
FEDERAL STATUTE HELD TO AUTHORIZE
DETENTION OF PERMANENTLY
INSANE ACCUSED
Petitioner for habeas corpus, conceded by the court to be permanently
insane and incompetent to stand trial for the federal crimes of which he
26. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14:3-13.2 (Supp. 1952); N.Y. GEN. CoRP. LAw § 34;
R.I. Acts & Resolves c. 2919 (1952) (ten percent).
27. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 716(b) (Purdon Supp. 1952); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§55-26(12) (1950); W. VA. CODE ANN. §3015 (1949).
28. E.g., CAL. Corn. CODE ANN. § 802(g) (1953); Micn. STAT. ANN. § 21.10k
(Supp. 1951).
29. See note 1 supra.
30. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14:3-13 (Supp. 1952); OHio GEN. CoDE ANN. § 8623-119
(Page Supp. 1952); OzLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.19(11) (1953).
31. Corporations may deduct charitable contributions up to five percent of their
net income. INT. REV. CODE § 23(q).
32. ANDREws, op. cit. supra note 9 at 42, cites U.S. TREAs. DEPT. PRESS RE-
LEASE No. S-3079, which indicates that contributions increased from 30 million dol-
lars in 1936, when the five percent deduction for contributions to charity first became
effective, to 223 million in 1949.
33. See Seidman, Save by Giving, 30 TAXES 338 (1952); Works, Tax Savings
by Charitable Conributions, 27 DIcTA 39 (1950).
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was accused,' requested release to state authorities, charging that the sec-
tion of the Criminal Code under which he was restrained 2 was unconstitu-
tional on the ground that it permitted the Federal Government permanently
to confine an insane person without a trial on the merits. Psychiatric
examinations of the petitioner had also disclosed homicidal tendencies. The
writ was denied with a recommendation that, if no state claimed petitioner
as a resident and assumed his custody and care, the committing court deny
release if it would endanger "the safety of the officers, the property, or
other interests of the United States." 3 The court found the authority of
Congress to confine a permanently insane person accused of a federal offense
in the federal criminal jurisdiction under the necessary and proper clause 4
and held that the statute authorizing detention was valid even though the
commitment may be for an uncertain and indefinite term. Kitchens v.
Steele, 112 F. Supp. 383 (W.D. Mo. 1953).
Each state, as parens patriae,5 has inherent jurisdiction over the insane
within its borders and through the police power has power over criminal
offenders.0 The Federal Government, limited by the Tenth Amendment,
has neither prerogative as parens patriae 7 nor common law criminal juris-
diction,s and has previously been held to lack constitutional power, except
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 495, 1708 (Supp. 1951).
2. 18 U.S.C. §4246 (Supp. 1951).
3. 18 U.S.C. §4247 (Supp. 1951).
4. U.S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 8. This application to the indefinite confinement of the
insane accused had been suggested by the author of the instant opinion in Higgins v.
McGrath, 98 F. Supp. 670 (W.D. Mo. 1951) (detention for a reasonable period
until sanity was restored held a valid exercise of federal power), order affirming
commitment on rehearing aff'd sub nom. Higgins v. United States, 205 F.2d 650
(9th Cir.), order denying writ of habeas corpus aff'd sub nom. Higgins v. Binns,
205 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1953).
5. Parens patriae, literally "father of his country," was originally applied to the
king and later to the state referring to its sovereign power under the common law
of guardianship over charities, infants, insane persons and others under a disability
who were incapable of acting for or protecting themselves. "The concept . . . is
of ancient origin, having been observed in the Roman Law of the Twelve Tables,
whence it was accepted in England as a direct prerogative of the Crown." In re
Sariyanis, 173 N.Y. Misc. 881, 883, 19 N.Y.S.2d 431, 434 (Sup. Ct. 1940). The
state legislatures, within constitutional limitations, are now deemed to possess all the
powers as parens patriae which the English sovereign had enjoyed before the Revolu-
tion. See, Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 57, 58 (1890).
6. Shapley v. Cohoon, 258 Fed. 752, 755 (D.C. Mass. 1918); In re Dowdell,
169 Mass. 387, 389, 47 N.E. 1033, 1034 (1897); Sohier v. Massachusetts Gen.
Hospital, 3 Cush. 483, 497 (Mass. 1849); Sporza v. German Savings Bank, 192
N.Y. 8, 14, 84 N.E. 406, 408-409 (1908).
7. Wells v. Attorney General, 201 F.2d 556, 559 (10th Cir. 1953) ; Dixon v.
Steele, 104 F. Supp. 904, 908 (W.D. Mo. 1951).
8. United States v. Eaton, 144 U.S. 677, 687 (1892); United States v. Hudson,
7 Cranch 32 (U.S. 1812). That there were no common law crimes against the
United States was first established in United States v. Worrall, 2 Dall. 384 (U.S.
1798). After the ratification of the Constitution, most early members of the Supreme
Court believed that the federal courts had the power to indict and prosecute common
law crimes within the scope of the federal power. See Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S.
87, 114, 115 (1925). Chief Justices Jay and Ellsworth and Justices Cushing, Iredell,
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within its exclusive jurisdiction, to deal with persons solely on grounds of
lunacy.9 The right of the United States to confine an insane person accused
of a federal crime is an incident of its criminal jurisdiction which depends
upon delegated constitutional authority to punish certain acts,10 to protect
its property and other interests," and to enforce all legislation necessary
and proper for effectuating the objects of the Government.12
The Sixth Amendment guarantees an accused a speedy trial; but, to
be competent to stand trial, the accused must have sufficient mental capacity
to understand the charges against him and to make a rational defense.13
To compel a mental incompetent to stand trial may deprive him of coherent
testimony in his own behalf or of defenses which he is incapable of con-
veying to his counsel. The statute authorizing detention was passed in 1949
to formalize procedures for determining the competence of persons accused
of federal crimes to stand trial 14 by allowing a trial court to commit an
accused who is judicially determined presently insane to the custody of
the Attorney General until he is competent to be tried or until charges
against him are disposed of. Decisions subsequent to this enactment have
held either that the statute was unconstitutional insofar as it authorized
the indefinite commitment of the permanently insane 15 or that the statutory
language 16 by strict construction authorized only a temporary detention.
17
Wilson, Paterson and Washington sustained this view. 1 WARREN, THE SUPREME
COURT in UNrrED STATEs HIsTORY 433 (1922).
The courts of the District of Columbia still proceed as at common law except
as otherwise provided by statute. Hill v. United States, 22 App. D.C. 395, 401
(1903).
9. See Higgins v. United States, 205 F.2d 650, 653 (9th Cir. 1953) ; Wells v.
Attorney General, 201 F.2d 556, 559 (10th Cir. 1953). The exclusive jurisdiction
includes members of the armed forces and residents of the territories and possessions
of the United States and of the District of Columbia. See DeMarcos v. Overholser,
122 F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (insane American returned to United States custody
by Canada); White v. Treibly, 19 F.2d 712 (D.C. Cir. 1927) (retired navy officer).
10. Counterfeiting the securities and coin of the United States, piracies and
felonies on the high seas, offenses against the law of nations and treason. U.S. CoNsT.
Art. I, § 8.
11. Cf. United States v. Pownall, 65 F. Supp. 147 (S.D. Cal. 1946), aff'd, 159
F.2d 73 (9th Cir. 1947), aff'd, 334 U.S. 742 n. (1948).
12. U.S. CONST. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 18; United States v. Worrall, 2 DalI. 384 (U.S.
1798); cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (U.S. 1819); United States v.
Hall, 98 U.S. 343, 346 (1878) ; United States v. Fox, 95 U.S. 670, 672 (1877).
13. United States v. Gundelfinger, 98 F. Supp. 630, 631 (W.D. Pa. 1951) ; Higgins
v. McGrath, 98 F. Supp. 670 (W.D. Mo. 1951); 18 U.S.C. §4244 (Supp. 1951).
14. See H.R. REP. No. 1319, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1-3 (1949); SEN. REP. No.
209, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1-3 (1949).
15. Edwards v. Steele, 112 F. Supp. 382 (W.D. Mo. 1952); Dixon v. Steele,
104 F. Supp. 904 (W.D. Mo. 1951).
16. ". . . until the accused shall be mentally competent to stand trial or until
the pending charges against him are disposed of according to law." 18 U.S.C. § 4246
(Supp. 1951).
17. Wells v. Attorney General, 201 F.2d 556 (10th Cir. 1953), 39 VA. L. REv.
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The one recent case that has permitted commitment under the statute in-
dicated that if the committing court found that the accused would be unable
to stand trial within a reasonable time it should release him, preferably to
the appropriate state authorities.' 8 The instant case, faced with a choice
between release or permanent confinement of a possibly dangerous, insane
man, has deviated from this line of authority by construing the statute '9
to mean that an accused found incompetent to stand trial may remain in-
definitely in the custody of federal officials if no state will claim him and
if his release will probably endanger the safety of the officers, property or
other interests of the United States. This interpretation, if constitutional,
assures detention while denying no procedural safeguards and permits
relocation in the petitioner's home state if one can be determined.
On the other hand, the present decision is a serious challenge to the
exclusive nature of state jurisdiction over the insane and a far-reaching
extension of federal power. Detention for trial of one temporarily in-
competent can be justified as a necessary incident to criminal jurisdiction,
but the constitutional argument in the instant opinion that the Federal
Government may confine a permanently insane accused as necessary and
proper to protect the lawful objects of government suggests no barrier to
federal detention of any permanently insane person. The confinement of
one who will never be tried and who therefore can never be proven guilty
cannot be incident to the criminal jurisdiction on which authority over the
insane accused had heretofore been held to depend.20 The instant case
speaks of Congress' power over the criminally insane, but if a man is never
tried he can never even be identified as the actor, much less be held respon-
sible. Furthermore, detention under a criminal accusation which will have
no determination in the foreseeable future nullifies any right to trial under
the Sixth Amendment and casts unfortunate innuendoes upon a person's
reputation and family. If the presumption of innocence 2' and the sole
jurisdiction of the states over the insane are to be meaningful, a federal
court should be required to dismiss the charges and release a harmless
accused person found permanently incompetent to stand trial. If the court
determines, however, that release of the accused would imperil society, he
should be released to authorities of his home state, and where none is
determined, as in the instant case, a presumption might be raised that he
is a resident of the state in which he was arrested.
18. On the grounds that: "The restraint is only to the extent and until defendant
is mentally fit for trial .. . Since the order [adjudging defendant incompetent for
trial] does not affect the status of defendant as to sanity but is limited in effect . . .
the attack on the constitutionality .. .fails, entirely." Higgins v. United States,
205 F.2d 650, 653 (9th Cir. 1953).
19. 18 U.S.C. §§4246, 4247 (Supp. 1951).
20. See Higgins v. United States, 205 F.2d 650, 653 (9th Cir. 1953); Wells v.
Attorney General, 201 F.2d 556, 559 (10th Cir. 1953).
21. Note, 3 WAsH. & LEE L. REV. 82 (1941) ; 9 WIGMoRnE, EVIDENCE §2511 (3d
ed. 1940); THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 551, App. B (1898).
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Criminal Law-
INDICTMENT FOR PERJURY AS TO BELIEF
INVALIDATED UNDER FIRST AMENDMENT
Defendant appeared before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee
and under oath stated that he had never been a sympathizer or promoter
of Communism or Communist interests. After being indicted 1 for per-
jury under the District of Columbia perjury statute,2 the defendant moved
to have the charge dismissed. The motion was granted on the ground,
inter alia, that the indictment was violative of the First Amendment. A
perjury count cannot be sustained where there could emerge no manifesta-
tion of overt acts but only a speculative fathoming of the human mind.
United States v. Lattimore, 112 F. Supp. 507 (D.D.C. 1953).
A perjurer is one who does not, at the time of the testimony in ques-
tion, possess an affirmative belief in the truth of his statements.4 Since
the defendant's disbelief is the essence of the crime, his statements must,
of course, be considered in the sense that he understood them.5 The jury,
in order to convict properly, must first determine what the words used
meant to the defendant at the moment of the allegedly perjured testimony,6
and then find that the defendant did not at the same moment believe in
the truth of his statements as measured against this meaning.7  In most
1. The indictment contained six other counts of perjury. The other counts
were: II. He did not know before 1950 that the Ch'oa Ting Chi was a Communist.
III. He did not know in the late 1930's that Asiaticus was a Communist. IV. He
did not, as editor of Pacific Affairs, publish articles (other than Russian contribu-
tions) by persons whom he knew to be Communists. V. He lunched with Soviet
Ambassador to the United States Oumansky after the Hitler invasion of Russia.
VI. He had not been requested, nor did in fact, take care of Lauchlin Currie's cor-
respondence while Currie was away. VII. He denied that neither he nor anybody
in his party made any prearrangements with the Communist Party in order to gain
entrance into Yenan. Counts I, III, IV, and VII were held invalid as violations of
the 1st and 6th Amendments. Counts II, V, and VI were held to require a bill of
particulars on the ground of indefiniteness. See note 3 infra.
2. 31 STAT. 1329 (1901), 22 D.C. CODE §2501 (1951).
3. U.S. CoNsT. AMEND. I. The indictment was also held violative of the Sixth
Amendment ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . .
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. . . ." U.S. CoNsT. AMEND.
VI), and Rule 7(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure ("The indictment
or the information shall be a plain, concise and definite written statement of the
essential facts constituting the offense charged. . ." FED. R. CRIm. P. 7(c)).
4. People v. Reed, 66 N.Y. Misc. 425 (Sup. Ct. 1910); State v. Cruikshank,
6 Ind. 62 (1841) ; Rex v. Pedley, 1 Leach 325, 168 Eng. Rep. 265 (1784).
5. See 2 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW §§ 1246, 1247 (10th ed. 1896).
6. The issue of the defendant's meaning at the time of the allegedly perjured
testimony, if raised, cannot be avoided by the showing of directly contradictory
statements by the accused prior or subsequent to the statements in question, since
it is impossible to tell from this alone which statement the defendant did not believe
to be true. In order to convict, the prosecution must prove that the defendant did
not believe the truth of the statements of the perjury charge, and thus the question
of the defendant's meaning would still be involved. McWhorter v. United States,
193 F.2d 982 (5th Cir. 1952); State v. Woolley, 109 Vt. 53, 192 Atl. 1 (1937).
Contra: State v. Hascall, 6 N.H. 352 (1833). See also MODEL ACT ON' PERJURY,
§§ 4, 10 (1952) (National Conference of Comm'rs of Uniform State Laws).
7. It does not make any difference whether the statements are in fact true
or not-the defendant's belief as to the truth or falsity is the crucial issue. Common-
wealth v. Miles, 140 Ky. 577, 131 S.W. 385 (1910) ; State v. Cruikshank, 6 Ind. 62
(1841) ; MILLER, CRIMINAL LAw § 160(c) (1934).
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perjury cases, the issue of what the accused considered his statements to
mean does not arise since the words used have a universally accepted
definition.8 Although there have been cases in which the language of the
allegedly perjured testimony might have been subject to varying interpreta-
tions,9 in only one, Seymour v. United States,") was the question of the
defendant's understanding of his own words squarely raised. The defend-
ant had there been found guilty of perjury by the jury for denying that he
had "encouraged" a third party to seek political office. The court below
had charged that the defendant's belief in the truth of his denial of en-
couragement must be determined in the light of the meaning the defendant
attached to the word "encourage" at the time of the allegedly perjured
testimony, but that in ascertaining this meaning, the jury may consider the
commonly accepted meaning of the term and the intelligence and experience
of the accused. On appeal, the court affirmed in spite of defendant's
contention that he understood "encourage" in a sense which would in-
validate the perjury conviction,'1 stating that the accused's meaning of the
statement was properly left to the jury under correct instructions by the
trial court.
The basis for the Seymour decision seems to be the court's realization
that while the question of the defendant's belief in the truth of his state-
ments can only be determined in the light of what he understood the words
to mean, the court cannot unqualifiedly accept as this meaning that which
the defendant says was his understanding of the term at the time of the
allegedly perjured testimony. Otherwise, in all perjury cases the accused
would invariably claim that his understanding of the words in question was
such as to preclude any possibility of conviction. It must thus be for the
jury to decide 12 whether or not the defendant actually understood the
8. See United States v. Babcock, 4 McLean 113 (7th Cir. 1846) (defendant
testified that he had travelled a certain distance); State v. Gates, 17 N.H. 373
(1845) (defendant testified that he was present during a particular transaction);
State v. Ledford, 195 Wash. 585, 81 P.2d 832 (1938) (defendant testified that he
was present when a particular accident occurred). See also Comment, 65 -ARV. L.
REv. 520 (1952).
9. See Commonwealth v. Edison, 10 Ky. L. Rep. 340, 9 S.W. 161 (1888) (de-
fendant testified that another was not drunk at a particular time; convicted on the
testimony of several witnesses who stated that the other behaved in an intoxicated
manner at the time in question) ; State v. Webb, 228 N.C. 304, 45 S.W. 345 (1947)
(defendant swore that another was mentally unfit; convicted on the testimony of ex-
perts that the other was not mentally unfit) ; State v. Hascall, 6 N.H. 352 (1833)
(defendant testified that he was afraid of being assaulted by another; convicted on
the testimony of several witnesses who stated that shortly after the testimony in
question the defendant had told them that he had not been so afraid).
10. 77 F.2d 577 (8th Cir. 1935).
11. The only evidence offered by the prosecution was that the accused had pre-
viously testified that he had made a trip for the purpose of getting the third party
to become a candidate, and had given money to another for this same purpose.
The defendant contended, however, that he understood "encourage" to mean coming
into contact with the third party and personally urging his candidacy, which the
prosecution had never proved. Seymour v. United States, supra.
12. The court might decide this question in cases in which reasonable men could
not differ as to defendant's meaning. See United States v. Norris, 86 F.2d 379 (8th
Cir. 1936), aff'd, 300 U.S. 564 (1937).
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words as he says he understood them. Furthermore, the defendant's
meaning of the statements cannot possibly be directly proved, but must be
inferred from other factors. Although the precise boundaries of the
scope of manifestations described by "encourage" are indefinite, there are
certain acts that all men of ordinary intelligence and experience would
consider to be embraced within the meaning of this term. If the jury
finds that the accused performed such acts, and is satisfied that he is of
ordinary intelligence and experience, it will convict.13
The above rationale is thus predicated on the assumptions that men of
ordinary intellect will agree on what acts are circumscribed by the crucial
phrase and that a jury will be capable of making allowances for those of
disparate intellect. But in the application of this rationale to the instant
case, the possibility of a wrongful conviction, although always present,
becomes a serious problem. It is questionable that there are many acts,
outside of espionage and party membership, that all men of ordinary in-
telligence and experience would consider as "Communist sympathizing," for
even among people of ordinary intelligence and experience the meaning of
this phrase will vary depending upon the particular individual's political
philosophy."4 While the assumption that a jury can usually be expected to
make allowances impartially for those who deviate from the ordinary
intellect may be valid, there appears to be little warrant for assuming that
a jury can be depended upon to make allowances unprejudicially for those
who deviate from the currently popular political views. The existence of
this hazard of wrongful conviction could mean persecution for failure to
conform to the politically orthodox and may very likely operate as a de-
terrent to new and unpopular ideas.15 When an individual can be sub-
jected to this peril, the sanctity of beliefs supposedly protected by the First
Amendment 16 has vanished.
13. Conversely, if the jury believes that the defendant's intelligence is so far
below normal that there exists a reasonable doubt that he realized his act was in-
cluded within the common definition of the term in question, it will acquit.
14. The meaning of "Communist sympathizer" varies from decade to decade.
Since the accused testified that he had never been a "Communist sympathizer," the
jury will have to make note of the fact that certain acts prformed during the United
States-Russian war alliance which then were thought patriotic, might, if performed
today, be considered as "Communist sympathizing."
15. Although here the defendant voluntarily made the statements, it is conceivable
that in the future a congressional committee might inquire as to whether a witness
sympathizes with some currently unpopular political position. The power of Con-
gress to make such inquiries has been sustained, Lawson v. United States, 176 F.2d
49 (D.C. Cir. 1949) ; Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1947). The
witness is left with the alternative of either answering or remaining silent on the
grounds of self-incrimination. If he does plead the privilege against self-incrimination,
he is taking the chance of failure to convince a court in a subsequent contempt
charge that his fear of incrimination was justified. See Estes v. Potter, 183 F.2d
865 (5th Cir. 1950) ; Note, 26 NOTRE DAM&E LAw. 68 (1950). If he speaks, he is run-
ning the risk of a wrongful conviction for perjury. The possibility of being placed in
this unenviable dilemma might tend to discourage people from lending their support to
unorthodox ideas. However, it must be recognized that the lack of a perjury sanc-
tion would weaken the investigative power of Congress.
16. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) ; Minersville School
Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 593 (1940); American Communications Ass'n v.
Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 393 (1950).
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Grand Jury-
RELEASE OF NAMES OF UNINDICTED PERSONS
TO NEWSPAPER HELD A SPECIFIC PRESENTMENT;
RECOMMENDATIONS TO COORDINATE BRANCHES
HELD INVALID
A federal grand jury investigated 13 officers of four unions 1 as to
possible perjury in filing their non-Communist affidavits under section 9(h)
of the Taft-Hartley Act.2 When these officers invoked their privilege
against self-incrimination 3 and refused to testify, the grand jury lacked
sufficient evidence to indict. Nevertheless, it handed up a "presentment" 4
stating that 13 officers of the named unions had not complied with the Act,
and recommending that the NLRB revoke the certification of the unions
and that Congress consider amending the act to include a waiver of the
self-incrimination clause in the affidavits. The same day, newspapers
throughout the country printed excerpts from the presentment together with
the names of the officers.&5 On petition by four of these officers and their
unions, the court expunged the report from the record, holding that since
there was every indication that the grand jury foreman and the United
States Attorney's office had intentionally given these names to the news-
papers, thereby violating their oath of secrecy, the report would be con-
sidered an invalid specific presentment; and also that the report was invalid
because it recommended action to the executive and legislature in violation
of the doctrine of separation of powers.6 Application of United Electrical,
Radio &" Machine Workers of America, 111 F. Supp. 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
The power of grand juries to issue reports originated in the Middle
Ages in the answering of questions propounded by the King concerning the
state of his lands, misconduct of public officials and matters pertaining to
the royal revenues.7 By the sixteenth century, a grand jury report was
1. United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of America; American Com-
munications Association; International Fur & Leather Workers of America; Distri-
bution, Processing & Office Workers of America.
2. 61 STAT. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(h) (Supp. 1951).
3. U.S. CoNST. AMEND. V.
4. As the court points out, this document is more aptly termed a report. A
presentment at common law was a recommendation to the prosecuting attorney,
made by the grand jury on its own motion, from which the prosecutor would draw
an indictment. For an example of this in practice see United States v. Hill, 26
Fed. Cas. 315, No. 15,364 (C.C.D. Va. 1809). See Dession & Cohen, The In-
quisitorial Functions of Grand Juries, 41 YA.E L.J. 687, 705 (1932). This form of
indictment is now practically obsolete. In re Funston, 133 Misc. 620, 233 N.Y. Supp.
81 (Sup. Ct. 1929); HousEL & WALSER, DEFENDING AND PROSECUTING FEDERAL
CRIMINAL CASES § 222 (1938) ; Dession & Cohen, supra, at 696. But see State v.
Davidson, 171 Tenn. (7 Beeler) 347, 103 S.W.2d 22 (1937). The word "present-
ment" is now usually synonymous with "report," and in this comment the two will
be used interchangeably. See In re Report of Grand Jury, 152 Md. 616, 137 Atl. 370
(1927).-
5. E.g. N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1952, p. 11, col. 1.
6. The officers also objected that there had been an inquiry into their religious
beliefs. Instant case at 869.
7. This type of inquest was summoned by the royal itinerant justices of the King
during the twelfth century. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 152
(2d ed. 1952).
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required before the local justices would approve expenditures for local
roads and bridges,8 but these duties have since become subsidiary to the
grand jury's chief function of investigating crime and returning indictments.
Today, the reports, addressed to the court, discuss the findings of inves-
tigations into crime or into institutions, often criticizing in general terms
certain practices and activities which have been uncovered, but for which
no indictment can be returned either because the activities do not constitute
a crime or because of insufficient evidence. 9 However, if these reports
accuse some individual by name with questionable or illegal practices, they
are expunged as "specific presentments" :o in order to protect as fully as
possible the person's reputation by removing the judicial sanction to an
accusation in which he had no right to appear and defend himself, to present
favorable witnesses, to cross-examine unfavorable witnesses,' or to make
a public rebuttal.' 2 This rule of expunging is a necessary companion to
the oath of secrecy 1- which grand jurors and prosecutors in all jurisdictions
8. SINEY & BEATRICE WEBB, ENGLISH LOCAL GOVERNMENT FROM THE REVOLU-
TION TO THE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION AcT; THE PARIsH AND THE COUNTY 449-
451 (1906).
9. See Alexander, Grand Jury Presentments, 13 PANEL 8 (No. 1, 1935). New
York seems to be outstanding for its successful use of grand jury investigations into
public institutions and offices. A detailed discussion of the report-making powers
of the grand jury is found in Dession & Cohen, supra note 4, at 706. Reports
are generally considered innocuous and occasionally even beneficial. In re Report
of Grand Jury, 152 Md. 616, 623, 137 Atl. 370, 373 (1927). However, some jurisdic-
tions refuse to allow any report where there is no indictment. Report of Grand
Jury, 204 Wis. 409, 235 N.W. 789 (1931). And there has been some question con-
cerning the existence of the report-making power of grand juries at common law.
See Medalie, Grand Jury Investigations, 7 PANEL S (No. 1, 1929).
10. Strong v. District Court, 216 Minn. 345, 12 N.W.2d 776 (1944); State v.
Bramlett, 166 S.C. 323, 164 S.E. 873 (1932) ; In re Report of Grand Jury, 152 Md.
616, 137 Atl. 370 (1927) ; Bennett v. Kalamazoo Circuit Judge, 183 Mich. 200, 150
N.W. 141 (1914); In re Hudson County Grand Jury, 14 N.J. Super. 542, 82 A.2d
496 (1951) (with discussion of cases). Cf. In the Matter of the Report of the Grand
Jury, 4 Dist. Ct. Hawaii 780 (1911), discussed in Note, 106 A.L.R. 1388
(court requested grand jury to remove objectionable matter from the report, accept-
ing it upon compliance). Some cases hold that expunging is a matter of discretion
with the lower court, Ex parte Cook, 199 Ark. 1187, 137 S.W.2d 248 (1940) ; Appli-
cation of United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of America, 109 F. Supp.
92 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). Contra: Irwin v. Murphy, 129 Cal. App. 713, 19 P2d 292
(1933) ; it re Report of Grand Jury, 152 Fla. 154, 11 So.2d 316 (1943). For a dis-
cussion of the New York decisions interpreting the New York Code of Criminal
Procedure § 260, see In re Healy, 161 Misc. 582, 293 N.Y. Supp. 584 (County Ct.
1937).
11. Hendricks v. United States, 223 U.S. 178 (1912); EX parte Holliway, 272
Mo. 108, 114, 199 S.W. 412, 415 (1917).
12. Specific presentments have been denounced in strong terms. See People
v. McCabe, 148 Misc. 330, 333, 266 N.Y. Supp. 363, 367 (Sup. Ct. 1933); Matter
of Jones v. People, 101 App. Div. 55, 59, 92 N.Y. Supp. 275, 277 (2d Dep't 1905)
(dissenting opinion).
13. FED. R. Cxm. P. 6(e) ; see In re Charge to Grand Jury, 30 Fed. Cas. 992,
995, No. 18,255 (C.C.D. Cal. 1872) (Field, J.). The same attacks that have been
made against the specific presentment have also been made against the "open!' sessions
of the House Committee on Un-American Activities. While the rules of Congress
provide that witnesses should have a chance to answer all charges in public, the
privilege is often effectively denied. See Carr, The Un-American Activities Coin-
tnittee, 18 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 598 (1950); Note, 2 CATHOLIC UNIV. oF AMERICA
L. REv. 34 (1951). For a criticism of a report by the House Committee, see Gell-
horn, Report on a Report of the House Committee on Un-American. Activities, 60
HALv. L. REv. 1193 (1947).
19531
256 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 102
are required to take for the purpose of protecting innocent suspects. 14 The
instant case is the first federal decision in which a specific presentment
has been expunged; 15 its effect is to wipe the report from the record so
that employers and administrative agencies cannot make use of it to the
prejudice of the accused.' 6
All critical grand jury reports involve some harm since even a general
presentment, which specifies no individuals, will subject all who are in-
volved in the criticized activity to suspicion. Furthermore, there is always
the possibility of leaks from the hearing room either by witnesses,' 7 who
are not bound by the oath of secrecy, or from jurors who do not choose
to abide by their oath. The instant court recognized these possible sources
of harm by expunging a presentment which, although general in form, was
specific in effect when combined with the leak of names to the newspapers. 18
The result of the case seems to be that any substantial revelation of con-
fidential grand jury proceedings which identifies the persons investigated
will be treated as part of the grand jury report and that the court will
therefore remove all judicial sanction from the information.19
The holding that the grand jury exceeded its authority in advising the
legislative and executive branches may be questioned in light of its his-
torical powers to advise the king 2o and perform certain legislative func-
tions,21 and in view of a recent Florida decision that grand juries have the
power to advise the Governor.22 The reasoning of the instant court was
14. If there had been sufficient evidence the court might have held in contempt
those responsible for the leak. In re Summerhaven, 70 Fed. 769 (N.D. Cal. 1895)
18 U.S.C. §401 (Supp. 1951).
15. But cf. In the Matter of the Report of the Grand Jury, supra note 10;
Poston v. Washington, A. & Mt. V. R.R., 36 D.C. App. 359 (1911) (specific pre-
sentment held libelous when published in a newspaper). However, federal grand
juries have returned specific presentments before, although no objection was taken
to them. Instant case at 869.
16. In the instant case, petitioners alleged that rival unions used the presentment
to cast doubt on their ability to maintain certification; thus prejudicing them in elec-
tions; and that an employer sought to have one of these unions stricken from the
ballot on the basis of the presentment. The employer's plea was denied in American
Cable & Radio Corp. v. Douds, 111 F. Supp. 482 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). See also note
27 infra.
17. Since witnesses are not required to take the oath of secrecy (FED. R. CRIm.
P. 6(e)), they become the most fertile source of information. However, their in-
formation is probably limited to the name of the suspect and their own personal
knowledge. Hale v. Henkle, 201 U.S. 43 (1906). The grand jurors, prosecuting
attorney and stenographers are all under oath.
18. The identification of the names of the unions in the general presentment
might well have been considered specific as to them, had the court held that they
had been accused of any crime. See text at note 26 infra.
19. Since at least one court has held that no judicial privilege against libel pro-
tects grand jurors who sign specific presentments (Rector v. Smith, 11 Iowa 302
(1860)), the holding in the instant case might suggest the extension of this risk of
suit to the grand jurors who signed this presentment. The cases are distinguishable,
however, if the leak is the result of the unauthorized act of another.
20. See note 7 ispra.
21. See text at note 8 supra.
22. In re Report of Grand Jury, 152 Fla. 154, 11 So.2d 316 (1943). The Florida
Constitution provides for a tripartite system of government. FLA. CoNsT. Art.
II.
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that the grand jury is an appendage of the court,2 with jurisdiction limited
to that of the court,24 and since the court has no power to advise coordinate
branches, 25 neither does the grand jury. Since there are no federal prec-
edents on this point, the court stressed the practical consideration that
labor relations is a delicate field and a grand jury's contact with the subject
is too one-sided for it to gain the broad perspective necessary for legis-
lative or administrative policy changes. In the case of the recommendation
to the NLRB, the result appears proper, for it was directed against specific
organizations and thus differed little from a specific presentment. Until
the organizations are cleared, their effective functioning is impaired and
their activities rendered suspect.2 6  There is an added danger if the recom-
mendation has engendered a public reaction; for administrative agencies,
although supposedly non-representative and judicial in character do react
to public opinion and are able to act so rapidly that their decision may be
substantially influenced by public opinion which has not yet subsided.
2 7
The agency, acting under these circumstances, might go so far as simply
to substitute for its own investigation the recommendations of the grand
jury.
While some of these considerations apply to recommendations by the
grand jury for legislation, they are not so compelling where they name no
organizations or individuals. Legislation by nature is general and is pre-
vented from operating as a bill of attainder 2 8 or an ex post facto law; 29
therefore, no particular organization will be injured except by future
judicial processes. Since legislative processes are less rapid than adminis-
trative action, the chance is lessened that the deliberations will be seriously
influenced by hasty public reactions resulting from the recommendation.
Furthermore, a grand jury functions on the theory that as a body of citizens
it will reflect the attitude of the public on the matter at hand.3 0 Since every
citizen has the right to petition Congress for redress of grievances 31 and
23. See In re Black, 47 F.2d 542, 544 (2d Cir. 1931) ; United States v. Hill, 26
Fed. Cas. 315, No. 15,364 (C.C.D. Va. 1809).
24. United States v. Hill, supra note 23.
25. The reason for this self-imposed judicial restriction is separation of powers.
For the letter of the Justices of the Supreme Court in which they refused to give
President Washington an advisory opinion, see FRANKFURTER & SHULMAN, CASES
ON FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE 36 n.1 (Rev. ed. 1938). See Hayburns
Case, 2 Dall. 408 (U.S. 1792) decided two years before the Justices' letter was
written.
26. See note 12 supra.
27. The instant case is an illustration of this danger. The NLRB sent out a
questionnaire asking the union leaders to reaffirm their oaths with threats of revo-
cation for a refusal to reply. The NLRB was permanently enjoined from taking
action on the questionnaires on grounds that the Labor Management Relations Act
left enforcement to the Justice Department. United Electrical, Radio & Machine
Workers v. Herzog, 110 F. Supp. 220 (D.D.C. 1953).
28. U.S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 9.
29. Ibid.
30. United States v. Smyth, 104 F. Supp. 283, 291 (N.D. Cal. 1952); Addison,
Duty of a Grand Jury in CHARGES TO GRAND Jupms 35, 36 (1800).
31. U.S. CONST. AmEND. I.
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the citizenry has always been considered the ultimate source of political
power,S2 a recommendation to Congress by citizens who have made some
study of the problem may be less an infringement on the doctrine of separa-
tion of powers than a reversion to the grand jury's function of reporting
on local conditions. The courts themselves recommend legislation where
they think that the existing law for the situation is unjust or outmoded
but feel obligated to follow precedent.P
Husband and Wife-
HOUSEHOLD FURNISHINGS PRESUMED TO
BE HELD BY HUSBAND AND WIFE AS
TENANTS BY THE ENTIRETY
Defendant husband, in his wife's action for separate maintenance, filed
a counterclaim to recover certain household goods and furnishings' which
plaintiff had taken and were now in her possession. The goods and furnish-
ings in question consisted of property purchased and paid for by defend-
ant, both before and during marriage, and property bequeathed to defendant
during marriage. Defendant contended that this property was exclusively
his and, therefore, that plaintiff had no right to take such property from
the family residence.2 The court held, inter alia, that husband and wife
presumptively hold household goods and furnishings as tenants by the
entirety 8 when such property is in their joint possession and use, and that
32. Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243 (U.S. 1833); McCulloch v. Maryland, 4
Wheat. 316 (U.S. 1819).
33. E.g., Hoadley v. Hoadley, 244 N.Y. 424, 437, 155 N.E. 728, 733 (1927)
(legislature acted on recommendation: N.Y. Civ. PRac. Acr § 1137, as amended,
N.Y. Laws 1928, c. 83; N.Y. DoMEsTIc RELATIONS LAW § 7(5), as amended, N.Y.
Laws 1928, c. 589) ; First State Bank of Annona v. Hidalgo Land Co., 114 Tex. 339,
343, 268 S.W. 144, 146 (1925) ; cf. Kotler v. Lally, 112 Conn. 86, 89, 90, 151 Atl. 433,
434 (1930) (majority and dissenting opinions; case resulted in remedial statute:
CONN. REv. GEN. STAT. § 7836 (1949)); Manker v. American Say. Bank & Trust
Co., 131 Wash. 430, 437, 230 Pac. 406, 409 (1924).
1. The household goods and furnishings which were involved in the instant case
consisted of linens, furniture, appliances, rugs and silverware. For an explanation
of the various items that are included in the term "household goods and furnishings"
see, e.g., Dixie Fire Ins. Co. v. McAdams, 235 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) ;
In re Burnside's Will, 185 Misc. 808, 59 N.Y.S.2d 829 (Surr. Ct. 1945) ; Smith v.
Findley, 34 Kan. 316, 8 Pac. 871 (1885).
2. Plaintiff won an award for separate maintenance in a previous decision, duPont
v. duPont, 90 A.2d 476 (Del. Ch. 1952), and, therefore, the problem in the instant
case, as to the ownership of the household goods and furnishings, was decided with-
out considering the question of separate maintenance.
3. It is interesting to note that neither party contended this in his brief. Com-
munication to the UNivmsnY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW RE iEW from Arthur G.
Logan, attorney for the defendant, (Oct. 26, 1953), on file, Biddle Law Library,
University of Pennsylvania Law School.
Because a wife could not hold title to personal property prior to the passage
of the Married Women's Property Acts, it was generally agreed that there could
be no estate by the entirety created in personalty; but since the passage of these
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the fact that the husband paid for or contributed such property to the
family home is only one fact to be considered in ascertaining whether or
not this presumption has been rebutted. duPont v. duPoit, 98 A.2d 493
(Del. Ch. 1953).4
At common law both the personalty which the wife owned before
marriage and that acquired by her during marriage belonged to her hus-
band,5 while the husband's personal property was solely his.6 This rule
was one of the many illustrations of the basic common-law concept that
"by marriage the husband and wife are one person in law" 7 and that since
the husband was considered the lord and master of his wife, it was he who
had complete control over all her activities." Although equity afforded
some relief to the harshness of the common-law property rules as they
affected married women,9 it was not until the passage of the Married
Women's Property Acts,' 0 which gave to wives the separate enjoyment of
property acquired by them before and during marriage," that any con-
siderable step was taken toward putting married women on an equal footing
with their husbands. Even since the passage of these acts it has been held
by most courts that household goods and furnishings in the joint possession
and use of husband and wife are presumed to be owned by the husband,1
although this presumption may be rebutted by the wife.13 The reasons
acts, there has been considerable disagreement among the courts as to whether
these acts, which enable a wife to hold title to personal property, permit husband
and wife to own such property as tenants by the entirety. See Note, 73 U. or PA.
L. REv. 88 (1925). Some courts have held that husband and wife may hold person-
alty as tenants by the entirety. See, e.g., Phelps v. Simon, 159 Mass. 415, 34 N.E.
657 (1893); In re Bramberry's Estate, 156 Pa. 628, 27 Atl. 405 (1893). Other
courts have maintained that both spouses may not hold such property by the entirety
but must hold it as joint tenants (e.g., In re Stebbins Estate, 125 Misc. 150, 210
N.Y. Supp. 424 (Surr. Ct. 1925) or as tenants in common (e.g., Dozier v. Leary,
196 N.C. 12, 144 S.E. 368 (1928)). For the differences among these three types
of co-ownership see 2 TIFANY, REAL PRoPERTY § 417 et seq. (3d ed., Jones, 1939).
4. Defendant's counterclaim was dismissed by the court since neither party, in
spite of the court's permission, requested a further hearing to introduce any addi-
tional evidence on the question of ownership of the household goods and furnishings.
Order of Seitz, J. (Del. Ct. Ch. Sept. 28, 1953).
5. 2 PoLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY or ENGLISH LAW 427 (2d ed. 1898).
6. Id. at 405.
7. 1 BL. Comm. *442.
8. Ibid.
9. Equity recognized a married woman's separate ownership in both real and
personal property when such property was conveyed or devised to another in trust,
to be held to her separate use. See 4 PomERoy, EQuIY JURISPRUDENCE § 1098 (5th
ed., Symons, 1941).
10. For a compilation of the Married Women's Property Acts see 3 VERNIER,
AmmucAzx FAmILy LAws § 167 (1935). In states which have adopted the community
property system all property acquired by either spouse during marriage is presumed
to be community property. 3 id. § 178.
11. 3 id. § 168.
12. See, e.g., Allen v. Eldridge, 1 Colo. 287 (1871); Smith v. Berman, 8 Ga.
App. 262, 68 S.E. 1014 (1910) ; Greenberg v. Stevens, 114 Ill. App. 483, aff'd, 212
IIl. 606, 72 N.E. 722 (1904) ; Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis v. Wall, 138 Miss.
204, 103 So. 5 (1924) ; State v. Kamuda, 98 Vt. 466, 129 Atl. 306 (1925).
13. Greenberg v. Stevens, supra note 12.
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given for such a view are that the husband is still the head of the family 14
and has the duty to support it 15 and that the Married Women's Property
Acts did not expressly provide for a change with respect to the common-law
presumption as to household goods and furnishings. 16 However, in
Vaughan v. Borland 7 it was held that in a controversy between husband
and wife personal property in the joint possession of both spouses is pre-
sumed to be owned jointly by them. Subsequently, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, in a dictum in Fine v. Fine,'8 criticized the rule which
allows a presumption of ownership of household goods and furnishings in
favor of the husband and approved an Orphans' Court decision 19 which
had ruled that such property is presumptively held jointly by husband and
wife. The instant case followed the trend established by the Vaughan and
Fine cases in so far as it held that there is a presumption of joint owner-
ship of household good and furnishings in the joint possession and use of
the spouses, but it extended the doctrine of the other two cases when it said
that this presumption could not be rebutted merely because the husband
alone either purchased or contributed the property in question.
To cling to dogmas, which have as their foundation the common-law
idea of the husband as lord and master of his wife, is both antiquated and
unrealistic in view of the fact that married women today are riot only
taking an active part in economic, political and social functions, 20 but, in
many instances, are making considerable monetary contributions toward
the sustenance of their families.21 It seems, therefore, that where husband
and wife jointly use and possess personal property a presumption of joint
ownership is proper; this applies especially to household furnishings, which
are often purchased from time to time throughout the marriage without
specifying whose funds are used and which spouse holds the title to each
particular furnishing. Moreover, even when a suit is brought by a creditor
of either spouse to attach household furnishings in the joint possession of
both spouses, it does not appear to be inequitable to permit the same
presumption of joint ownership to apply. The quantum of evidence neces-
sary to rebut the presumption should be less, however, than in a suit be-
tween husband and wife, for either spouse is in a much better position to
know to whom title belongs than is a creditor who is less familiar with the
14. Rice v. Sayles, 23 Ill. App. 189, 194 (1886); see Smith v. Berman, 8 Ga.
App. 262, 270, 68 S.E. 1014, 1019 (1910).
15. Schwartz Estate, 166 Pa. Super. 459, 462, 71 A.2d 831, 833 (1950).
16. Allen v. Eldridge, 1 Colo. 287, 290 (1871); Rice v. Sayles, 23 III. App.
189, 194 (1886).
17. 234 Ala. 414, 175 So. 367 (1937).
18. 366 Pa. 227, 228-9, 77 A.2d 436, 437-8 (1951).
19. 68 Pa. D. & C. 154 (1949), rev'd, 166 Pa. Super. 459, 71 A.2d 831 (1950).
20. See BEARD, WOMAN AS A FORcE IN HISTORY (1946).
21. In 1950, almost one-third as many married women were earning an income
as were married men, and the median income of the wives, who were earning an
income, was slightly less than one-third that of the husbands who were earning an
income. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, REPORT ON THE INcOE OF FAMmIES AND
PERSONS IN THE UNITED STATES, Series P-60, No. 9, 35 (1952).
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family situation.2 2  In addition, the fact that the present case held that the
presumption of joint ownership was not rebutted merely because the hus-
band brought the furnishings into the household is a valid recognition of
the fact that normally a wife makes contributions to the family, other than
monetary ones, such as caring for the children and maintaining the home in
a liveable condition.2 The requirement in the instant case that a spouse
must produce documentary evidence of separate title to household goods and
furnishings, in order to overcome the presumption of joint ownership of
such property,24 places a heavy burden on the spouse attempting to rebut
the joint possession presumption, since, until an actual dispute arises be-
tween- them, it seems unlikely that spouses contemplate the need to prove
separate ownership of their property. But since the burden of rebuttal may
have been equally as stringent under the prior rule, it seems more reason-
able to place it upon whichever spouse is claiming separate title rather than
to require the wife to overcome a presumption in favor of her husband in
every controversy with respect to the goods and furnishings in their home.
Internal Revenue--
DEDUCTION OF FEDERAL STOCK TRANSFER
TAX AS A BUSINESS EXPENSE
PERMITTED TO TRADER
Petitioner's deduction, as a business expense, of the cost of federal
stamp taxes which he paid as a trader I on the sale of various securities 2
during 1947 was disallowed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, who
contended that the amounts so expended were capital expenditures and
should be offset against the selling price of the securities in determining
capital gain or loss.8 In a suit for the recovery of the alleged overpayment,
22. Cf. Vaughan v. Borland, 234 Ala. 414, 415, 175 So. 367, 369 (1937)..
23. However, these criteria may not be applicable to the situation involved in
the instant case since the duPont family is wealthy enough not to require that the
wife perform household duties, and the court's opinion does not indicate that any
children were born of this marriage. See duPont v. duPont, 93 A.2d 500 (Del. Ch.
1952).
24. When both spouses are dead and the dispute involves the administrators or
executors of husband and wife, the burden of proving title to personalty would be
even more difficult, and under the "old doctrine" the deceased wife's representative
could rarely succeed.
1. In general, a trader is one who buys and sells securities primarily for specula-
tion rather than for sale to customers. For an analysis of the distinctions among
traders, dealers and investors see Tarleau, How and When to be a Dealer, Trader,
or Investor in HANDBOOK OF TAx TECHNIQUES 916 (Lasser ed. 1952) and cases
cited therein.
2. See INT. REv. CODE § 1802(b).
3. For an explanation of how much a trader can save in the payment of federal
income tax by deducting the federal stock transfer tax from gross income rather
than subtracting it from the selling price of securities on each transaction see
ALLISON, INVESTORS' TAx PLANNING 268-70 (1946).
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the Court of Claims held that traders could deduct the federal stock transfer
tax as an ordinary and necessary business expense. Hirshon v. United
States, 113 F. Supp. 444 (Ct. Cl. 1953).
Prior to 1944, federal stock transfer taxes were deductible from gross
income as taxes,4 but the Revenue Act of 1943 permitted the deduction of
these taxes only if they constituted an ordinary and necessary business or
non-business expense.5 For three years after the passage of the Act, the
Commissioner allowed the deduction of these taxes as either business or
non-business expenses,0 but in 1946 he issued a new interpretation which
permitted only dealers 7 to deduct them as expenses.8 In so ruling, the
Commissioner apparently relied 9 on the cases of Helvering v. Winmill ' 0
and Spreckles v. Commissioner.-" In the Winmill case the Supreme Court
decided that commissions paid for the purchase of securities were capital
expenditures and had to be added to the cost of the securities, while in the
Spreckles case the Court held that commissions paid incident to the sale
of securities were deductible as a business expense only by dealers, and that
traders had to treat such expenditures as an offset against the selling price
of the securities. In both decisions the Court was greatly influenced by
the fact that a treasury regulation, prescribing such treatment, 2 had sur-
vived re-enactments of the Internal Revenue Code over many years. The
reason advanced by the Commissioner for the different treatment which
the treasury regulation afforded dealers, with respect to selling commis-
sions, was that accounting procedure made it difficult for these individuals
to handle such commissions as a subtraction from the selling price on each
transaction.'8 Although the dealer usually buys securities in large quan-
tities, his sales are in numerous, smaller quantities and are sold at varying
4. Revenue Act of 1942 §23(c) (1), 55 STAT. 700 (1942).
5. "In computing net income there shall be allowed as deductions:
"Taxes paid or accrued within the taxable year, except-
"Federal . . . stamp taxes . . . but this subsection shall not prevent such . . .
taxes from being deducted under subection (a)." INT. REV. CODE § 2 3 (c) (1) (F).
Subsection (a) permits the deduction from gross income of business and non-business
expenses. Furthermore, legislative history indicates no reason for the change. See
H.R. REP. No. 871, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1943); SEN. REP. No. 627, 78th
Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1943).
6. 4 CCH 1945 FED. TAx REP. 6083.
7. A dealer is one who purchases securities primarily for sale to customers and
maintains a regular place of business. See Tarleau, supra note 1, at 917-21.
8. I.T. 3806, 1946-2 Cum. BULL. 41.
9. Instant case at 445.
10. 305 U.S. 79 (1938).
11. 315 U.S. 626 (1941).
12. "Commissions paid in purchasing securities are a part of the cost price
of such securities. Commissions paid in selling securities, when such commissions
are not an ordinary and necessary business expense, are an offset against the selling
price." U.S. Treas. Reg. 77, Art. 282 (1933). The italicized portion of the regu-
lation was interpreted to provide for the accounting difficulty encountered by
dealers.
13. G.C.M. 15430, XIV-2 Cum. BULL. 59, 60 (1935).
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prices. As a result, his commissions to his salesmen are often paid on a
volume of sales, instead of on each transaction, which makes it difficult for
him to compute such selling commissions on each sale of securities.14
The problem of whether or not the doctrine of the Spreckles case,
which required traders to treat selling commissions as capital expenditures,
should be extended to other selling expenses made in connection with the
sale of securities, arose in regard to the payments made to the lender in a
short-sale transaction to recompense him for dividends paid by the corpora-
tion."" In Commissioner v. Levis' Estate 10 the court, relying on the
Spreckles case, held that the payment of such sums was of a capital nature
and, therefore, had to be offset against the selling price by a trader, but
implied, on the other hand, that a dealer in securities could deduct these
payments as a business expense.' 7  However, Commissioner v. F. A. Wil-
son,'8 distinguishing Spreckles and Winmill, held that these payments
should be deducted by a trader as a business expense because they "'can in
no way add to the value of the stock which the taxpayer does not possess
at the time of payment' " 9 and they are paid solely to maintain his posi-
tion in the market. The Commissioner later acquiesced in the principle
laid down in the Wilson case.
2 0
The accounting difficulty encountered by dealers, which formed the
basis for the distinction made between dealers and traders in the Spreckles
case, is not applicable to the situation involved in the instant case 21 because
the federal stock transfer tax must be computed on each transfer of secu-
14. Id. at 61.
15. In a short sale A (taxpayer) makes a contract to sell certain shares of
stock to B; but if A does not have the shares available and does not want to pur-
chase them immediately, he borrows them from C and delivers them to B. A then
deposits the full market price of the borrowed shares with C; and until the loan is
returned, there are daily payments between A and C according to the fluctuations
of the market price of the borrowed shares. A is bound to pay to C the amount
of the corporation dividends paid on these shares while the loan continues, and C
must pay the amount of assessments on the stock. Eventually, on the initiative of
either A or C, A must deliver to C the same number of shares which were borrowed,
and C has to return the deposit, and usually interest thereon. See Provost v.
United States, 269 U.S. 443 (1926).
16. 127 F.2d 796 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 645 (1942).
17. "It is true that in the case of a dealer in securities such commissions may
be considered an ordinary and necessary business expense. . . . No reason is ap-
parent why expenses incurred in borrowing stock incident to selling short should
not be treated the same as selling commissions." Id. at 797.
18. 163 F.2d 680 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 842 (1947) ; accord, Commis-
sioner v. Wiesler, 161 F.2d 997 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 842 (1947) ; W.
Hinkle Smith v.' Commissioner, 44 B.T.A. 104 (1948). See 96 U. oF PA. L. REv.
421 (1948).
19. Commissioner v. F. A. Wilson, 163 F.2d 680, 682 (9th Cir. 1947), quoting
from 'Dart v. Commissioner, 74 F.2d 845, 847 (4th Cir. 1935).
20. 1948-1 Cum. BuLL. 3.
21. The instant case is also distinguishable' from Spreckles and Winmill be-
cause of the lack of a treasury regulation of long standing in regard to the federal
stock transfer tax. See instant case at 445.
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rities.22  The basic problem, therefore, is the determination of whether
or not the amounts spent for this tax should be treated as a capital ex-
penditure or a business expense for both dealers and traders.23 Although
the transaction on which the tax is paid is of a capital nature, the payment
of this tax does not add to the value of the securities sold, other than to
relieve the person paying it of his liability to the Government, in the same
manner as he would be relieved of liability by meeting any other obligation
which he might incur. Furthermore, there is no permanent effect on the
asset since one or more of these stamps must be affixed to a security on
each transfer of that security, and the number of transfers of a particular
share or bond has no relation to its value. Perhaps the payment of selling
commissions more nearly approaches the concept of increasing the value of
the securities than does the expenditure made for the federal stock transfer
tax, but it would not even seem unreasonable to treat commission expendi-
tures as a business expense since they too are of a recurring nature and do
not permanently improve the asset. Moreover, Congress specifically pro-
vided that § 23(c) (1) (F) should not prevent the federal stock transfer
tax from being deductible as an ordinary and necessary business or non-
business expense. Finally, the fact that traders are required to deduct
state stock transfer taxes from gross income 24 presents the anomalous
situation of requiring traders to treat the federal stock transfer tax as a
capital expenditure and the state stock transfer tax on the same transfer
of securities like a business expense.25
Although the court in the instant case required the petitioner to prove
that he was a trader before it would grant summary judgment,26 this does
not necessarily mean that the opinion precludes an investor from deducting
the payment of the federal stock transfer tax if it constitutes an ordinary
22. U.S. Treas. Reg. 71, § 113.32 (1948). See also affidavit of Henry Brach,
[Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and Brief in Support Thereof, p. 15.].
It should also be noted that since the stamps are affixed to each certificate, there
should be little difficulty in computing the tax on each transfer of securities.
23. Although permitting the federal stock transfer tax as a business deduction
rather than a capital expenditure could mean a saving in income tax for the trader,
note 3 supra, it would make no difference in the dealer's income tax because the
latter is allowed to inventory his securities, and his gains and losses are treated as
ordinary gains and losses. See INT. REv. CODE §§22(c), 117(n) and U.S. Treas.
Reg. 103, §19.22(c)-5 (1940).
24. "[State] stock transfer taxes . . . are deductible by the taxpayer as taxes
,paid and may not be added to the cost of the stock or used to reduce the selling
price thereof in determining gain or loss." G.C.M. 18245, 1937-1 Cum. BULL. 70.
The above regulation also applied to the federal stock transfer tax prior to the
passage of the Revenue Act of 1943.
25. When an item is deductible "as a tax" it is deducted from gross income in
the same manner as a business expense is deducted from gross income.
26. Instant case at 445. Subsequently, plaintiff's motion for summary judgment
was granted without requiring further proof that he was a trader. Hirshon v. United
States, 4 P-H 1953 FED. TAx SERv. 172,746 (Ct. Cl. 1953). This action was ap-
parently taken by the court because defendant conceded plaintiff's status as a trader.
See communication to the UNIVERsITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REviEw from John
P. Allison, attorney for the plaintiff (Sept. 1, 1953), on file Biddle Law Library,
University of Pennsylvania Law School.
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and necessary non-business expensem2 7 Even if the instant case applies
only to dealers and traders, this decision will probably be extended so as to
allow investors to deduct the tax as a non-business expense because previ-
ous decisions indicate that non-business expenses are to be treated equiv-
alently with business expenses.
28
27. In plaintiff's complaint he sought the refund by two alternative causes of
action. In the first cause of action plaintiff alleged that he was a trader and was
entitled to deduct the tax as a business expense; in the alternative he alleged that he
was an investor and was entitled to deduct the tax as a non-business expense.
However, plaintiff sought summary judgment on only the first cause of action.
[See Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and Brief in Support Thereof, p.
17.].
28. "Section 23(a) (2) is comparable and in pari materia with § 23-(a) (1),
authorizing the deduction of business or trade expenses. . . . The effect of
§ 23(a) (2) was to provide a class of non-business deductions coextensive with the
business deductions allowed by § 23(a) (1). . . ." Bingham v. Commissioner, 325
U.S. 365, 373-4 (1944). Cf. McDonald v. Commissioner, 323 U.S. 57, 62 (1944).
See also Nahstoll, Non-trade and Non-business Expense Deductions, 46 MIcH. L.
REv. 1015 (1948). Furthermore, the Code provides that § 23(c) (1) (F) shall not
prevent the tax from being deducted as a non-business expense, and investors are
the only class of persons who could deduct this tax as a non-business expense.
